In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington

If there was ever a living argument for Wall Street training for all future Treasury Secretaries, it's Robert Rubin. The skill set he brought to bear during his six years as a central player in the Clinton administration (at NEC and Treasury respectively) injected wisdom, calm, and cool rationality to a host of late '90s financial crises. Traditionally the preserve of sedate retired CEOs accustomed to measured, bureaucratic decision making and drawn out consequences, Treasury in the late '90s had some adjusting to do. Robert Rubin proved himself more than up to the job, riding the tiger of lightning fast capital mobility abroad and spiralling deficits at home into an era of unmatched propserity and hope.Rubin's probablistic approach to problem solving is the central idea around which he builds his compelling biography, doubling back to it again and again as he rises through the ranks of the arbitrage desk at Goldman Sachs and then through his tumultuous tenure in the Clinton cabinet. For every problem there is a set of solutions, he asserts, each with offsetting levels of risks and benefits. It's the effective measurement of these solutions that provides the central ingredient for successful problem solving at every level.On the arbitrage desk at Goldman his mastery of disciplined situational analysis reached its zenith in a number of complex hedging deals that yielded enormous profit both for himself and the venerable firm. But even more important (at least for the nation and the world later on) the experience left him with an intuitive sense of the way currencies and interest rates interact, the powerful impact of economic expectations on growth and inflation, and the perils and pitfalls of spreading risk among ever more disparate financial intermediaries.These internalized lessons, along with a personal fiscal prudence and a fundamental belief in government as an agent of good, led Rubin into his most famous incarnation at Treasury, that of deficit hawk. Administration policy coalesced, through Rubin's skillful and often impassioned salesmanship, around a theory of economic growth through low long term interest rates, a scenario possible only under a regimen of budgetary discipline. Thus began the long and ultimately successful slog of the administration and the Democratic party toward a new incarnation as the standard bearer for balanced budgets and low interest rates, an effective reversal of forty years of institutional practice.In the meantime, in the greater world, the internet had arrived and capital controls had fallen throughout the former second world of communist nations, enabling capital to flow unimpeded and with ruthless speed among nations and financial institutions. The immediate result of all this dynamism was the hair raising spectacle of debt and currency crises from Mexico to Russia, all of which occurred during Rubin's watch. The consequences of mismanagement in these situations was no less than world economic collapse, yet the treasury secretary's skillful stewardship replenished the store of that most precious of economic commodities, confidence.Rubin's mind is one the world still needs, and happily he seems to want to continue to share it. In this work he's generous with references to his personal life and history. More influenced by his politcally active grandparents than his own mother or father, Rubin developed a sense of social responsibility coupled with respect for market forces at an early age. All through his education at Harvard, the London School of Economics, and on through his various careers, his sense of decency and civic obligation dominates his thinking. For a guy determined to remove emotion from problem solving, he maintains some core values that defy cold exmination.That might be one reason why his arguments against tax cuts, delivered later in the book, seem one-sided and doctrinaire. While he shares the goal of strong growth (who doesn't?) with policy makers in the present administration, he categorically rejects the idea that lower marginal tax rates can lead to this end. Nor does he evince any inclination to attack growing deficits from the standpoint of cutting spending. His battle with the Gingrichites ten years ago has left him in an ideological vacuum in this one regard.But he could be proved right, as he has so many times before. Quibbling with Robert Rubin's instincts is rationally, probably, not a good idea. If he is proved wrong, however, on any point, look for Rubin to accept it with out sour grapes. It's the world's greater good he strives for, not his own ego, and for one man, he's taken the world a long way.

My decision to read this book was based on an editorial I read many months ago in the Wall Street Journal. I remember the Journal's editors announcing that they thought "Rubin was probably correct" about some policy regarding interest rates and the deficit. Frankly, I didn't much understand the admission at the time but made a mental note. One day I wanted to make some time and understand this issue.Needless to say, I was excited to have that opportunity sooner rather than later. I saw Mr. Rubin's book mentioned in the Financial Times, recalled the editorial, and immediately bought the book. In short, I was pleasantly surprised. Not only do I now understand the relationship between America's deficit and interest rates, but I have a whole new appreciation for topics such as arbitrage, probabilistic thinking, political uncertainties, bailouts of other countries, the interconnectedness of economies in a globalized world, and for Mr. Rubin himself.The book is one part autobiography, one part business and political memoir, and one part economic instruction (101 level, for people like me). We learn about Mr. Rubin's upbringing, the fortuitous circumstances that took him to Harvard and later Goldman Sachs, the challemges of building an arbitrage department, and of course the challenges of the Clinton years and serving as the Secretary of Treasury. No doubt Mr. Rubin has lived a good and interesting life, and I enjoyed following his account and many observations.One nice aspect of this book is that I don't feel like I am reading a highly biased or revisionist spin on history. Sadly, the same cannot be said of other characters from the Clinton administration (e.g., R. Holbrook). I have read enough about the Clinton administration to feel that the author is giving a pretty fair account of events and people. I also appreciate his taking the time to make slightly complex ideas very clear and simple, such as arbitrage or the relationship between deficits and interest rates. Finally, when reading his accounts of international financial crises, I felt the tensions of a very difficult decision. Mr. Rubin has convinced me that the choices we face when dealing with international economic crises are never as simple as the media pundits would have us believe. These are very complex issues with good arguments on both sides--and our leaders must make decisions. I like to think I have a greater appreciation for just how difficult these decisions must be.I can't claim this book was as interesting as a good mystery or a John Fowles novel, but compared to other nonfiction this is a very enjoyable and fairly well-written book. I feel like I have learned something about economics, business, politics, and the author. I am left with the sense that talking with Rubin about these issues, over a cup of coffee, would be very rewarding. He has an interesting mind. I guess this book is worthwhile for that fact alone--it has made Mr. Rubin's interesting thoughts available in a very readable style.

A detailed and delightful tale of a banker turned politician. Covering the major economic crisis in the late 20th century (Clinton Administration).A good read for aspiring politicians, consultants and amateur / professional economists on the hand in glove nature of current affairs and applied economics.

Ich kannte den Namen Robert Rubin aus seiner aktiven Zeit im Weißen Haus.Mir wurde das Buch in einem Gespräch über logische Entscheidungsfindung empfohlen. Hier kann man von Rubin mit seiner sehr logischen und vor allem durch seine Zeit als Arbitrageur bei Goldman Sachs durch Wahrscheinlichkeitsdenkenke geprägte Denke noch einiges lernen.Für mich ein sehr gutes Buch, welches auf jeden Fall lesenswert ist wenn man sich für Finanzen/Politik und oder Entscheidungstheorie & Logik interessiert.

Honest account of days at Goldman Sachs, Treasury Secretary, Citigroup, the book offers good insights into Robert Rubin's thought process in decision-making in an uncertain world. He comes up as a person who is well aware of complex probabilistic nature of real world as opposed to simplistic deterministic system and this awareness seems to have helped to enhance probability of his success in business and politics. He also struck me as very balanced person. As successful as he is, he does not seem to rely on social success for his self recognition, which enables him to say no to what he considers unreasonable even if that means risking his position.

○米国の元財務長官ルービン氏の、政策当局者としての経験がきわめて率直に語られている貴重な本として推薦します。メキシコ危機、アジア通貨危機など緊迫した時代に、民間からきた同氏が悩みながら決断していった過程が隠さずに語られているのが魅力です。この時代の世界経済・金融を実感をもって勉強できるので、広く購読くを薦めたい好著だと思います。○このての本はきざかもしれませんが、原著を読んだ方が数段おもしろいと感じました。時間が作れる方は、英語のニュアンスを楽しみながら読む本として価値があります。○本を読んでいて、グローバル化の中で日本の比重が小さいと改めて痛感しました。日本の政策当局者はほとんど登場してきませんし、政策議論でも日本の判断の間違いが厳しく書かれています。アメリカにとって日本が占めるウエイトが下がっていることルービン氏は直截に語っています。こうしたアメリカの日本を見る厳しい視点を知る上でもこの本の価値があると思います。○前ＦＲＢ議長のグリーンスパン氏も回顧録を書く予定のようですので、刊行されましたら、本書と合わせて読んでみたいと思っています。

位人臣を極めた(?)人間の内面を覗いてみやうと手に取ったら400頁の演説原稿を読まされた気分だった。文学的に読むとかなりつまらない。誰の悪口も言わないし、外交的な本でもある。人間ドラマ的に多少面白いといったらば、韓国の財務大臣相手にルービン氏がキレて暴言を吐くあたりくらいか。顔を見せない表紙写真が多くを物語っている。組閣直後に政権メンバーが懇親会を開く場面があるのだが、クリントン氏が自分の幼少時代を語り、「キミたちも何か聞かせてくれよ」と誘うとルービン氏は憮然としてこう思う。「皆に語る身の上話なんて何もない」と。つまりそういう本なんである。自分語りではなく、大衆への啓蒙書なんである。啓蒙の中味は、政治と金融の不可分の関係、財政政策と長期金利の連動性、グローバリゼイションの意味、貧困問題、途上国支援のあり方等々。だからそういったテーマにご興味のある方にはお薦めだが、金融関係の話だと、金融本を読む習慣のある方には目新しい部分はないかもしれない。マーケットの不確実性、数式モデルの脆弱性、probability、市場参加者の(というか人類全体か)の懲りない体質、といったテーマは最近(昔からか)よく目にするものだ。個人的には、アジア危機の対応についてIMF批判ばかり見ていたので、ルービン氏の抗弁は新鮮だった。最も「へー！」となった部分は、財務長官発言として、「A strong dollar is in our interest」という文言を｢I believe it's in our interest to maintain a strong dollar｣に変えただけで為替市場が反応をするので、マーケット関係ではオウムのように同じ発言を繰り返していた、という部分。なる、グリーンスパン氏の奇奇怪怪な言葉使いなどは故意に煙に巻く為だったのか。ともあれ、現役でエライ人の回想録にはこれからは手を出さないことにしやうと思った、というのが正直な感想。