---
product_id: 52931772
title: "Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45"
price: "S$44"
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reviews_count: 13
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---

# Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45

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## Description

On June 22, 1941, before dawn, German tanks and guns began firing across the Russian border. It was the beginning of Hitler's Operation Barbarossa, one of the most brutal campaigns in the history of warfare. Four years later, the victorious Red Army has suffered a loss of seven million lives. Alan Clark's incisive analysis succeeds in explaining how a fighting force that in one two-month period lost two million men was nevertheless able to rally to defeat the Wehrmacht. The Barbarossa campaign included some of the greatest episodes in military history: the futile attack on Moscow in the winter of 1941-42, the siege of Stalingrad, the great Russian offensive beginning in 1944 that would lead the Red Army to the historic meeting with the Americans at the Elbe and on to victory in Berlin. Barbarossa is a classic of miltary history. This paperback edition contains a new preface by the author.

Review: A Gripping and Riveting Account of Operation Barbarossa - The hardcover edition of this book was published in 1965, with an author's forward for the reprinted version in 1985. Despite the archival resources that the author didn't have access to in 1965, his research efforts and literary skills bring Operation Barbarossa to life. The description that the author provides on the relationships between Hitler and his generals contributes to the doom that befell the Germans during a campaign that was massive in scale and depth. The euphoria that spellbound the German army after their successful invasions of Poland and France would not apply to the war on the Eastern Front. We learn about the resentment and maneuvering that occurred within the German High Command and the inner circle of Adolf Hitler. Even before the invasion of Russia, the mistrust that plagued the command structure of the German army played out in power struggles that contributed to the demise of Barbarossa. The author accesses the map rooms of Adolf Hitler and we witness the slow mental and physical decline of the leader who said that the "world will hold its breath" when the German army invaded Russia. We see the mistakes that German leadership made prior to the invasion: 1) underestimating Red Army forces; 2) difficulties with logistics and supplies; 3) a limited understanding of history on the part of Adolf Hitler; 4) poor intelligence concerning Russia strength; 5) a lack of winter clothing; 5) wider gauged railroad tracks in Russia than in Germany; 6) Hitler's claim that just kicking in the door will cause the" entire rotten structure of Russia to come crashing down." The German Army was confronted by an opponent of a completely different kind from those in the West; it failed to appreciate that the Russian soldier "loves a fight and scorns death." This information sets the stage before German tanks and guns began firing across the Russian border. The early days of the invasion resemble those of Poland and France, but the German Army quickly learns that the resistance of the Russian soldier is so intense that some believe they have killed the same man twice. The summer successes that the German Army experiences with victories at Mink and Smolensk contribute to the false belief that the campaign will end in months. The intoxicating momentum that drives the German Army comes to a grinding halt when Hitler decided to attack Leningrad and Kiev instead of Moscow. His decision to divide the strength of Army Group Center - and postpone a full assault on Moscow before the rains and winter set in - does not bode well for the German Army. If you like World War Two history, please consider having this book on your shelf. The details that it provides on Operation Typhoon (the Batlle of Moscow) as well as the deathtrap of Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk will not disappoint. You will be introduced to Guderian and Manstein on the German side and to Zhukov, Chuikov, and Timoshenko on the Russian side. The last chapter concerns the final, ill-fated efforts that the German Army made to slow the Russian forces that head to Berlin. This book provides the foundation and inspiration for other authors to write about a very important part of miliaty history.
Review: Dated, but still among the best accounts. - There has been a lot of scholarship since this was first published in 1965 (updated in the mid-70s I think), but this still stands the test of time and is probably the most readable account available. Glantz goes way way too deep, and other authors base themselves on new interpretations (Stahel) — all good and very worthwhile — but I keep coming back to Clark for the clarity and coherence of the story. Clark, like most, glosses over the underlying evil that marked the purpose of the campaign, and the sidesteps the unpardonable conduct (holocaust, prisoners, reprisals) and the absolute complicity of the senior officers who claimed no knowledge. But that is par for most eastern campaign narratives, and only a few authors have heroically tackled those issues.

## Technical Specifications

| Specification | Value |
|---------------|-------|
| Best Sellers Rank | #1,535,988 in Books ( See Top 100 in Books ) #2,568 in Russian History (Books) #3,058 in European Politics Books #3,474 in Military Strategy History (Books) |
| Customer Reviews | 4.6 out of 5 stars 339 Reviews |

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## Customer Reviews

### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ A Gripping and Riveting Account of Operation Barbarossa
*by N***P on February 2, 2019*

The hardcover edition of this book was published in 1965, with an author's forward for the reprinted version in 1985. Despite the archival resources that the author didn't have access to in 1965, his research efforts and literary skills bring Operation Barbarossa to life. The description that the author provides on the relationships between Hitler and his generals contributes to the doom that befell the Germans during a campaign that was massive in scale and depth. The euphoria that spellbound the German army after their successful invasions of Poland and France would not apply to the war on the Eastern Front. We learn about the resentment and maneuvering that occurred within the German High Command and the inner circle of Adolf Hitler. Even before the invasion of Russia, the mistrust that plagued the command structure of the German army played out in power struggles that contributed to the demise of Barbarossa. The author accesses the map rooms of Adolf Hitler and we witness the slow mental and physical decline of the leader who said that the "world will hold its breath" when the German army invaded Russia. We see the mistakes that German leadership made prior to the invasion: 1) underestimating Red Army forces; 2) difficulties with logistics and supplies; 3) a limited understanding of history on the part of Adolf Hitler; 4) poor intelligence concerning Russia strength; 5) a lack of winter clothing; 5) wider gauged railroad tracks in Russia than in Germany; 6) Hitler's claim that just kicking in the door will cause the" entire rotten structure of Russia to come crashing down." The German Army was confronted by an opponent of a completely different kind from those in the West; it failed to appreciate that the Russian soldier "loves a fight and scorns death." This information sets the stage before German tanks and guns began firing across the Russian border. The early days of the invasion resemble those of Poland and France, but the German Army quickly learns that the resistance of the Russian soldier is so intense that some believe they have killed the same man twice. The summer successes that the German Army experiences with victories at Mink and Smolensk contribute to the false belief that the campaign will end in months. The intoxicating momentum that drives the German Army comes to a grinding halt when Hitler decided to attack Leningrad and Kiev instead of Moscow. His decision to divide the strength of Army Group Center - and postpone a full assault on Moscow before the rains and winter set in - does not bode well for the German Army. If you like World War Two history, please consider having this book on your shelf. The details that it provides on Operation Typhoon (the Batlle of Moscow) as well as the deathtrap of Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk will not disappoint. You will be introduced to Guderian and Manstein on the German side and to Zhukov, Chuikov, and Timoshenko on the Russian side. The last chapter concerns the final, ill-fated efforts that the German Army made to slow the Russian forces that head to Berlin. This book provides the foundation and inspiration for other authors to write about a very important part of miliaty history.

### ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Dated, but still among the best accounts.
*by H***6 on March 18, 2019*

There has been a lot of scholarship since this was first published in 1965 (updated in the mid-70s I think), but this still stands the test of time and is probably the most readable account available. Glantz goes way way too deep, and other authors base themselves on new interpretations (Stahel) — all good and very worthwhile — but I keep coming back to Clark for the clarity and coherence of the story. Clark, like most, glosses over the underlying evil that marked the purpose of the campaign, and the sidesteps the unpardonable conduct (holocaust, prisoners, reprisals) and the absolute complicity of the senior officers who claimed no knowledge. But that is par for most eastern campaign narratives, and only a few authors have heroically tackled those issues.

### ⭐⭐⭐⭐ Operation Barbarossa and the Many Questions
*by K***N on October 14, 2018*

Several questions surround Operation Barbarossa - why did Germany attack in 1941, did they ever have a chance to win, when was the turning point and what was the number one reason they lost. These questions are still being debated to this day because the Eastern Front in WW 2 will forever hold our attention as one of the most thrilling yet tragic stories in world history. In fact the Western Front in WW 2, though more thorougly covered, is just a side show to the cataclysm on the Eastern Front. Alan Clark's book does a great job at examining these questions as well as bringing multiple parts of the drama to life. He paints with a journalistic vigor and - shockingly - is relatively unbiased. Unfortunately, this book was written so long ago that he did not even know that Martin Bormann died in 1945 (his remains were found in the early 1970s). This means that a lot of material now known to the West was unavailable to Clark at the time of writing but it also means that he had access to many living actors at the time. The book is also lacking in maps so some of the narrative is hard to follow unless you are intimately acquainted with European geography at a local level. Finally, this is not a comprehensive narrative: Clark chooses only to focus on major events such as the Moscow front in 1941, Stalingrad, the Kursk salient, and the final dark days of Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, Clark does a wonderful job with the key battles and explains well the political, technological, and tactical developments. So what about those questions? It appears Germany chose the right year to attack because the Soviet Union was ill prepared for the onslaught and was in disarray with the recent Stalin purges. They probably should have attacked earlier than June 22, however. Had they attacked in 1942 or 1943 it is quite possible they would have been defeated even quicker. But - again - why attack? This was the plan from the beginning. It was never a question of if but when. The Nazis saw themselves as saviors of Western Civilization and that included a crusade against Bolshevism. They felt that England was isolated and that Japan would keep the USA busy so concerns about a two-front war did not override the desire to attack at that point. Did they ever have a chance to win? This is very debateable but it appears they certainly did but the window of opportunity closed quickly. What was the turning point where that window closed? Was it the winter debacle outside of Moscow 1941? The failure to subjugate Leningrad and let loose Army Group North (which was pinned for 4 years)? The most favorite choice of course is Stalinggrad and it is hard to argue against it but did Germany not still have a chance in the summer of 1943 when they chose - unwisely - to attack a superior Russian defense at the Kursk salient? I am on the fence as to what was the turning point but I am not convinced it is StalingGrad, as devestating as it was. Germany still had a chance in 1943 but they threw it away. I tend to think that Guderian's plans, which Hitler ignored, could have worked for 1943-1944. What was the ultimate reason for Germany's loss? First the Russians deserve a lot of credit for their indomitable spirit, bravery, perserverance, and industriousness. There was a whole litany of strategic failures for the Germans - the Nazi ideology which alienated potential, natural allies like the Ukranians; the failure to coordinate with Japan; the reliance on weak allies like Italy and Romania; the internal dissensions; the meddling from Hitler; the lack of focus for Army Group South; the poor spy network, the arrogance of assumed Teutonic superiority that constantly underestimated their enemy, and the failure to appreciate the Russian environment and poor road system. Even the overcomplicated nature of their tanks compared to the simplicity of the Russian T-32 was a factor.

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*Last updated: 2026-10-18*